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The origin of materials requirements planning in  
Frederick W. Taylor's planning office 
 
Abstract 
 
Materials Requirements Planning systems appeared without significant provenance. Their 
theoretical and practical antecedents can be traced to Frederick W. Taylor’s Shop Management 
that described a production planning and control system comprised of functional foremen and 
clerks. This system failed for it was too complex, unwieldy and expensive. Nevertheless, some 
elements survived- for although the whole was unmanageable a few individual functions 
survived as independent sub-systems. These continued in use; with Taylor’s planning office 
remaining an ideal and well known theoretical construct. The planning office imposed 
unbearable information processing demands on contemporary manual systems. But from the 
mid-1930s accounting machines started providing more capable information technologies that 
first allowed these individual elements to be implemented as stand-alone applications. Later they 
were then integrated into more full systems. Taylor’s planning office provided the sub-system 
pieces and the conceptual framework for their subsequent recombination and extension. This 
paper traces the evolution of production planning and control systems from Taylor’s planning 
office to materials requirements planning systems. Not only are the linkages between production 
management thinking in the different periods unappreciated; but so too are the technological 
relationships between the information technologies used. 
  
  
 
 
The origin of materials requirements planning in  
Frederick W. Taylor's planning office 
1. Introduction 
Production management has progressed significantly over the past century. Current 
Enterprise Resource Planning systems are derived from 1970s Materials Requirements Planning 
(MRP) Systems (Jacobs and Weston, 2007) that Mabert (2007) shows are developments from 
1940s production planning systems. Mabert (2007) claims they used ‘the general logic’ of MRP 
systems. Skinner (1985: 79) observes that these early systems were ‘…in effect a computerless 
form of MRP… with the calculations done by the business machines of the 1920s and 1930s.’ 
These historical developments are not widely recognised or accepted: Harris’ (1915) economic 
quantity models and its later variants are considered by Gilbert and Schonberger (1983) and 
Rondeau and Litteral (2001) to be the predecessors of MRP. This latter view is questionable 
since Orlicky (1975: ix) pointedly observed that: ‘Materials requirements planning has become a 
new way of life in production and inventory management, displacing older methods in general 
and statistical inventory control in particular….’ [Emphasis added] The profound 
incompatibilities between MRP applications in dependent demand production and Economic 
Order Quantity (EOQ) models best suited to inventory control in independent demand 
applications further confounds the possibility that the earlier EOQ models evolved into the later 
MRP systems. Mabert’s (2007) unsubstantiated assertion about the capabilities of 1940s systems 
requires documentation; and their provenance and development further investigation. This paper 
provides a longitudinal study of the development of production planning and control systems 
over a 70 year period, comparing Materials Requirements Planning to Taylor’s Planning Office 
both conceptually and operationally; and traces their implementation across contemporary 
information technologies: manual methods first, then crudely automated using electro-
mechanical “accounting machines” until those yielded to electronic data processing systems and 
ultimately modern computers.  
The functionality of 1940s systems will be described and their origins identified. These 
implemented Taylor’s Planning Office (Taylor, 1903, 1911; Thompson, 1914, 1917; Elbourne, 
1918). These planning and control activities only became practical once information processing 
systems became powerful enough to deal with the volume of data and complex analysis required. 
Planning Office activities were initially performed in the early 1900s by hand with card-based 
information processing and analysis.  After the late 1920s these information processing tasks 
were increasingly transferred to accounting machines, electro-mechanical information processing 
systems. These further developed so that by the late 1940s and 1950s they then lead onto digital 
computer technology.  Orlicky (1975: 6) observed that the chief obstacle to implementing MRP 
before the 1960s had been insufficient data handling, manipulation and computation capacity. 
Despite these inadequacies, Taylor’s Planning Office introduced many ideas and practices found 
in MRP. Materials Requirements Planning systems remain important today, a survey cited by 
Bartholomew (2006) found 80% of the best manufacturing plants used it and another 8% 
intended to do so; and its logic is used very widely even in non-manufacturing concerns. An 
understanding of MRP/ERP is considered essential knowledge for operations managers.  
2. Methodology 
Historical research methods seem subjective with events and data often yielding a variety 
of differing interpretations. In this case the complex links between production management 
  
 
 
systems and contemporary information technologies; the influences on them both, and their own 
influences on later ones will be assessed. This study identifies numerous similarities and 
consistencies at specific times, and across time to establish that these historical influences are 
valid inferences. The evidence builds the case that Taylor’s Planning Office’s functions and their 
coordination and integration provided the conceptual and practical foundations for subsequent 
production management systems and ultimately underpinned MRP systems.  
Although Taylor is the most prominent management theorist (Kanigel, 1997), and 
Drucker (1954) considers his Scientific Management the most important American contribution 
since the Federalist Papers the preponderance of attention focusses on that and not his 
contributions in Engineering (high-speed steel and machine shop practice) or production 
planning and control (Functional Foremanship). This study intends on remedying that by 
showing that Taylor’s system survived and influenced later developments, and that evolving 
information technology systems played a vital role in their early and subsequent implementations 
and re-integration. Given the seventy-year long period surveyed, the different technologies; 
manual, electro-mechanical and then digital, and varying management environments, it is 
unsurprising that this evolution has been unrecognized, even by other historical reviews such as 
Mckay (2003).    
The data was collected from a comprehensive literature review concerning production 
management systems from 1904 through the mid-1970s. Taylor and his immediate circle’s 
(Gantt, Galbraith, Barth, etc.) writings were reviewed, as were contemporary commentators 
(Thompson, Clark and Elbourne) to establish a starting position. Orlicky and proponents (Plossl, 
Wight, etc.) of MRP provided an ending position. Links between them were sought in the 
intervening literature. Prominent later commentators such as Alford (ASME president after 
Taylor), Diemer, Kimball and Porter were investigated; publication lists from major publishers in 
the genre (Macgraw-Hill, Ronald Press, and Reinhardt) were reviewed; and citations found in all 
these were pursued. The periodical literature was investigated too. In addition, documentation on 
the differing period’s information technologies was reviewed. The earliest treatments were found 
in discussions of production management systems. Then, as accounting machines became more 
widely used, the accounting literature started covering these systems. Later nascent information 
technology publications provided information discussing system implementations from journals, 
conference proceedings and research monographs, as have modern histories of information 
technology. Some documentation came from proprietary documentation from IBM. This 
evidence should be authoritative and comprehensive though the nature of historical research 
makes it impossible to be fully exhaustive. 
Our argument that these systems should be considered influential follows from the mass 
of material and its popularity. The figures shown later are not obscure or easily overlooked. 
Alford’s Handbook was published in numerous editions over many years (Jaffe, 1957). 
MacNiece (1951) published numerous printings over several years. Koepke (1941, 1949, 1954 
and 1961) published several printings over 3 editions. The flow charts shown also originate in 
books well known to the industry. The literature cited was well established and easily available 
then and even now.  
The information technologies used to implement these concepts and practices were more 
difficult to identify. Until the 1930s discussions of Taylor’s system often showed illustrations of 
the forms used with details of their information and its processing. The advent of accounting 
machines and mechanised information processing lead to less attention being given to these 
  
 
 
aspects in the production management literature. Documentation on accounting machine 
implementations has not been so readily available since general treatments provide little 
discussion of operational concerns apart from inventory accounting, and the more specialised 
treatments are superficial overviews provided by manufacturers or user reports. An important 
aspect of our argument is that system developers and users would have used their experience 
with manual and accounting machines when developing MRP. That knowledge is almost 
invisible for it has not been well referenced; and a number of potentially useful proprietary 
sources haven’t been obtainable, a common difficulty in historical research. 
3 The planning office’s rise, fall and revival 
Production planning and control systems are inherently complex and difficult to 
understand. It is unfortunate that the Planning Office was not well described in Taylor (1903). 
Copley (1923: 173) notes ‘Brevity was gained at the cost of a general failure to explain things in 
sufficient detail to establish their real significance.’ Better descriptions (Nelson, 1980) of 
Taylor’s systems and its operations are found in Elbourne (1918) and Thompson (1914, 1917). 
The Planning Office failed for many reasons but a significant factor was its heavy demand on 
manual information handling and processing. Further significant issues arose with its 
organisational demands in requiring specialised staff performing specific planning, coordination 
and control activities. The Planning Office’s functional foremen may not be readily recognisable 
to modern readers. This reflects an increasing professionalization of roles, status and 
nomenclature: When Taylor spoke of ‘bosses’ and ‘foremen’ these roles are now filled by 
managers, supervisors and engineers. Where Taylor spoke of ‘clerks’ these positions came to be 
filled by planners and schedulers. Taylor’s archaic terminology creates a dissonance that 
artificially separates current roles from their historic equivalents. The Planning Office was a 
complex solution to very difficult problems in production management and inventory planning 
and control. Taylor operated in a less sophisticated organisational atmosphere unreceptive to 
complex organisational solutions and possessing less effective information technologies.  
Copley (1925) maintains that only four companies fully implemented Taylor’s system 
and he does not identify them. Person (1929) provides a broad survey of the wide use of 
scientific management within American industry but Taylor himself (Copley, 1925) often 
considered many of these uses to have been restricted. The literature on Taylor’s planning office 
typically considers it to have failed. Drucker, 1954 maintains that scientific management more 
generally had been stagnant for many years; just as newly emerging digital technologies were 
about to revitalize Taylor’s planning office’s functions within modern production planning and 
control systems.  
The capabilities and operations of 1940s production planning and control systems will be 
reviewed; and their derivation from Taylor’s Planning Office shown. Best practice in manual 
and later accounting machine systems will be the focus rather than common practice that was 
often crude. Taylor’s Planning Office shaped subsequent developments by setting patterns for 
planning and control methods and systems. Figure 1 shows the evolutionary path envisaged. 
Taylor’s Planning Office was not entirely his invention and drew upon a number of unspecified 
sources (Taylor, 1886) as well as his own experience (Copley, 1923; Kanigel, 1997). It is a 
synthesis of contemporary practices into a coherent whole. 
  
 
 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Taylor’s Planning Office did not completely die- it could be said to have fragmented 
because various functions were well considered and continued as independent activities, just as 
they probably did before Taylor’s synthesis brought them into an integrated system. An example 
is Taylor’s Balance of Stores Clerk and inventory management methods that were used 
effectively without requiring other Planning Office activities. Other roles in inspection, time-
study, routing, etc. could also be used independently. Partial implementation yielded benefits, 
though not so great as if the whole were possible, or practicable. Many Planning Office functions 
survived as independent activities (Alford & Bangs, 1945; Mitchell, 1939). Alford and Bangs 
(1945) describe how the functional foremen evolved: Taylor’s ‘Gang Boss’ was replaced by two, 
‘Set up’ and ‘Move’ men. The ‘Speed Boss’ evolved into an ‘Assistant Foreman’. The ‘Repair 
Boss’ and ‘Inspector’ became whole departments for repair and maintenance and for quality 
control and inspection. Taylor’s ‘Time & Cost Clerk’ evolved into two departments- payroll and 
cost accounting. The role of the ‘Instruction Card Man’ became the new profession of industrial 
engineer. The ‘Order of Work Clerk’ became the new ‘Schedulers’ and ‘Machine Loading 
Planners’. Taylor’s Planning Office was acknowledged (Alford and Bangs, 1945; Mitchell, 1939: 
292) as the foundation for production management. It was so well known (Kanigel, 1997) that 
references were not needed (and common practice in the 1940s and before seldom cited sources 
as well as modern conventions would dictate). The Planning Office ideal was a useful framework 
for aligning the functional foremen and clerks with their 1940s and later equivalents.  
Taylor’s introducing the whole system was not successful but significant elements of 
survived through the 1920s and 1930s and their manual information systems provided 
foundations for developing accounting machine applications. Inventory management was 
implemented as an accounting function (Schackel and Lang, 1929), but its extension to 
production control was apparent and Taylor’s systems provided a production management 
perspective on that. The reintegration of these planning office functions is comparable with the  
sequentially phasing in of functional subsystems until complete as often done with subsequent 
implementations of MRP. 
3.1 From punched cards to MRP 
Only manual information systems were available to Taylor’s Planning Office. 
Information was stored, transferred and processed using hand-punched and hand-processed cards 
(Evans, 1911, Metcalfe, 1886: 475-6; Taylor, 1886; Thompson, 1914, 1917). Taylor used the 
best information technologies then available. The Planning Office used both stable and volatile 
data: ‘Master’ Data. Much information did not change often and many cards recording it were 
‘static’. Bills of materials, routings, work methods and standards were stable. These records were 
held in ‘Master Cards’ library to be duplicated as needed for distribution and use. Other 
information used for planning, coordinating and controlling factory activities was volatile: cards 
directed workers to use, move material and to perform specific operations any time such 
activities were needed. Cards were used to coordinate supplies from varied sources at varied 
times and places for timely assembly. Move cards directed output from a process onward to 
downstream activities. The cards provided management feedback by being passed back and forth 
between the Planning Office and the shop floor as the work was first issued, as it progressed 
through the required processes and the completion of each reported. With many customer and 
  
 
 
production orders, processes, employees and products the Planning Office generated hundreds, 
even thousands of card records. Controlling card issues and their handling required discipline 
with formal methods and systems. These card records were later called a ‘unit record’ (IBM, 
1936) showing a specific instruction or the outcome of a given activity. Cards were a 
preternatural design and operational choice: 
1 They were made of a more robust material than paper pages or ledgers. Individual cards 
provided a single record that would be easily transportable and usable. Bound ledgers 
would only be accessible to a single user at a time. Single pages could be almost 
impossible to track and were too fragile for most factories. 
2 The original manual system designed cards in convenient sizes, colours and formats. 
Mechanisation imposed standardisation but initially designers had great freedom in 
designing record formats; and even later applications allowed some flexibility as shown 
in Casey and Perry (1951). 
3 For accessibility cards were easily mounted in racks or hooks, or for secure visibility 
mounted under glass; and for portability they could be sized to fit workmen’s pockets.. 
4 Each card could be easily changed as the data or its format varied; or as managers 
changed their information collection, dissemination and analytical requirements.  
5 Most significantly, managers and workers could physically punch cards to record, 
retrieve and analyse data. This maximised functionality making the recording of data its 
first step for processing and analysis. Figure 2 illustrates how cards could be punched and 
readily sorted or searched by hand. 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
3.2 Efficient internal communications 
An information network capable of dispatching and collecting cards throughout the 
factory was essential. If employees all had to queue for every card the Planning Office would be 
overwhelmed; and output and wages would be lost. Efficient internal mail systems were critical, 
providing regular; even hourly (Evans, 1911: 171-2), communications. The planning office 
closely tracked when activities began and finished by using time clocks for accurate reporting. 
Taylor insisted on written records recognising that verbal and later telephonic communications 
were less reliable, offsetting their speed and convenience. 
3.3 Card based data analysis  
Cards provided managers with information on activities and costs (Thompson, 1917). 
They were particularly advantageous for analyses. Materials and labor usage could be found by 
manually (or later mechanically) sorting cards by ‘order’ and summing; and then a running total 
for usage to date. Such usage information could be combined with cost data to yield both 
‘process’ and the ‘total to date’ order cost. An employee’s wages would be determined by sorting 
cards by workman to find their output, combined then with appropriate piecework rates to yield 
wages payable. The machine utilisation rates were determined by sorting by machine and 
totalling to get overall usage, noting that down-time, maintenance and repair data too would be 
collected. Key information processing activities were sorting, collating and totalling information 
to provide management reports and analyses. Thompson (1917) observed that these processes 
gave managers exactly the information they needed quickly—on the next day. He contrasted that 
with end-of-month reports produced by contemporary accounting systems. This information was 
  
 
 
cheap because data collection and basic reporting was already being done to manage production. 
The additional sorting, collating and calculating required were modest extensions; the labor 
intensive and difficult work of creating (punching cards reduced the need to manually rewrite or 
reproduce that information), then gathering and distributing the information was already done 
and most of the costs incurred.  
Large factories generated insurmountable information workloads for manual methods. 
Forms and documents shown by Thompson (1917) are hand-written or typed. There was no 
significant mechanisation of these tasks before the 1930’s. The mathematical capabilities of early 
accounting machines were minimal: before 1928 they could only add, multiplication was 
introduced in the 1930s, and division only in 1946 (van Ness, 1967: 16). Taylor’s Planning 
Office functions were implemented as stand-alone systems on accounting machines. Twyford 
(1918: 115-6) describes early machine bookkeeping as applied to conventional accounting 
clerical work controlling inventories, rather than within the Planning Office’s framework. 
Sanders (1928, Vol. 3: 93) observed that the number of users and the variety of their needs were 
growing. Clark (1925: 66) also discussed cards but these contained written information for 
manual processing rather than punched data for electro-mechanical processing. Bennett (1926: 
17) describes accounting machines used for inventory management. Anon. (1955), Buse (1957), 
IBM (1961), Porteous (1937) and Stevens (1945) provide examples of stand-alone functions of 
the Planning Office implemented using accounting machines.  
These applications became more integrated from the late 1930s through the mid-1940s 
(Hill, 1963; Moore, 1951; Porteous, 1955). Taylor’s system by the late 1940s was achieved by an 
integrated production management system implemented using electro-mechanical accounting 
machines. This provided both conceptual and physical foundations for later digital systems. 
Accounting machines provided well developed, reliable and effective technologies for data entry, 
sorting, storage and output through cards; and for printing. The accounting machines’ use of 
relays switched either ‘on’ or ‘off’ was a ‘digital’ technology demanding essential, basic 
mathematics (addition and multiplication, followed by complementary mathematics for 
subtraction and finally, division). Although later, more sophisticated scientific applications 
stimulated digital computing advances it should be clear that their foundations lay in the prosaic 
business requirements served by accounting machines: ‘We know that many of the technological 
developments in computing that were possible in the 1940s and 1950s came from the more 
immediate past.’ with ‘The focus should be on the equipment (technical considerations) and the 
uses for these in offices. This latter point—applications—is  of particular significance because it 
encouraged many to look for better ways to perform common counting and accounting functions 
(Cortada, 1983).’  
Accounting machine applications were ‘programmed’ so data was used to produce the 
necessary results and reports. This was done using plug boards that could be removed and 
manually configured using jumper wires for various applications. Multiple plug boards could be 
used and stored so frequent or complex applications were readily at hand (van Ness, 1967): early 
stored programs comparable to current game machine cartridges. This increased equipment 
flexibility and cost effectiveness by facilitating changing applications. By the mid-1930s 
accounting machines reached the point where they could be used for common production 
planning and control activities; individually at first, and then combined for greater functionality 
through systems integration. 
  
 
 
Cortada (1996: 168) recognises the difficulties bridging the different ‘generations’ of 
digital computers. Without a ‘migration path’ each generation had to recreate applications 
already developed. This gulf is wider for the earlier accounting machine technologies. The MRP 
literature shows virtually no citations of earlier developments of production planning systems 
implemented on accounting machines; Orlicky (1975: 119) has the only one known. When 
implemented on accounting machines these complex management systems required numerous, 
time consuming runs for reading, sorting, replicating, computing, punching and printing cards 
and reports. Although the data management and technical challenges were significant the 
underlying concepts were readily transferred from manual to electro-mechanical systems and 
subsequently to digital technologies. Carlin (1958) identifies a developer that selected its client 
in 1952 for their experience with a similar accounting machine system. Grieser (1954: 169) 
describes a conversion from an accounting machine to a digital system. Caplan and Schatz 
(1959, p 245) discuss a similar case: ‘The existing card system was adapted to computer 
handling with a bare minimum of change.’ Haigh (2009: 7) observes that managers introducing 
digital computing had ‘extensive’ backgrounds with accounting machines, and that experience 
had a ‘profound influence’. Cortada (2000: 134) believes: ‘Tabulating technology is a 
particularly important forerunner of computers because the users of tabulating machines would 
be the first adopters of computer technology….’ This linkage between accounting machines and 
digital computing generally is also true for production management systems. It is inconceivable 
that IBM and other developers would have ignored decades of theory, practice and experience 
embodied in accounting machine implementations when developing their digital replacements. 
Users and systems developers would have known the earlier implementations and that 
knowledge would have been used. Although ‘migration paths’ did not exist the earlier theory, 
experience and practical knowledge was surely influential. 
4. MRP and the planning office functions 
Miller and Sprague (1975) provide a framework for comparing the basic functions of 
MRP and the Planning Office. They identify four central functions in MRP: the Bill of Material 
(BOM) File, the Inventory Status (IS) File, the Master Production Schedule (MPS), and the MRP 
Logic package. These will be used to compare the Planning Office to MRP. Information on MRP 
will be drawn from Orlicky (1975) in addition to Miller and Sprague (1975). For information 
about the Planning Office the sources used will be Elbourne (1918), a popular general production 
management book (Urwick and Brech, 1966) with more detailed information on the Planning 
Office from Thompson (1914, 1917). The Planning Office is ‘modern’ in understanding the 
simultaneity of managing both production and inventory: ‘The subject of stock control is so 
intimately linked up with production efficiency….’ (Elbourne, 1918: 153) He discusses the 
Planning Office in a basic manner comparable to Miller and Sprague's (1975) discussion of 
MRP.  
4.1 Bills of materials 
MRP systems are dependent on identifying the correct components, their inter-
relationships and accurate quantities for production planning. Bills of Material (BOM) are thus 
essential for these systems to be effective. MRP systems apply great effort to ensure that the 
Bills of Materials are correct. The Planning Office was equally cognizant of the importance of 
BOM accuracy:  
  
 
 
It may seem an ultra-refinement to specify every nut, washer and cotter pin, but it 
must be borne in mind that the right quantities have to be learnt at some stage of 
production for issuing the details to the fitters and erectors (Elbourne, 1918: 133).  
This substantiates Mabert’s (2007) belief: Figure 3 reveals that 1940s best practice in 
production planning systems used exactly the same logic as later MRP systems in making a 
level-by-level BOM ‘explosion’ complete with ‘netting’. Figure 3 (Moore, 1951) is attributed to 
IBM and dates at least to 1945 where the graphic (though not the accompanying text) is in the 
Handbook (1945: 231) edited by Alford and Bangs. Alford was an early advocate of systematic 
management and although often critical of Taylor’s work he promoted its most effective 
features. The mid-1940s understanding of the BOM explosion is identical to an earlier 
description in Thompson (1914, 1917), and with that of later MRP systems. It processes BOM 
data level by level, with higher level demands satisfied first by on-hand stocks at each level, and 
then projected requirements imposed down the product structure and accumulated until the items 
at lower levels are processed. This yields a detailed production plan for all finished items, 
assemblies, sub-assemblies, components and other inputs. 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Insert Figure 3 Here 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
A crucial shortcoming is its failure to show time-phased requirements. There is no explicit 
recognition in the Figure that the various inputs must be produced or purchased at different times 
depending on their lead times. Nevertheless, lead time off-setting was recognised as an essential 
element in coordinating operations:  
There will be considerable differences in the time necessary for piloting the 
respective components through their various stages of production and this means 
that there ought to be all that difference in the time of starting work on the 
components, if delivery of the whole set or sets is to be synchronised at a given 
date (Elbourne, 1918: 170).  
so that: ‘The time at which the last component for a given complete product is finished virtually 
marks time of useful readiness of all the others (Elbourne, 1918: 170).’ This is identical to 
Evendell’s (1968) identification of time-phased planning with effective, ‘modern’ management. 
Figure 4 (Knoeppel, 1920: 323) illustrates time-phased production planning in a manner 
comparable to that shown in Orlicky (1975). The Planning Office’s significant concerns with 
shop floor control (dispatching, material transfers, work study, etc.) made time-phasing central 
to their planning. Progress Charts shown by Gantt (1903) and Clark (1922) were used to 
coordinate operations across processes over time to meet deadlines. This critical feature seems 
forgotten when EOQs were adopted that ‘scientifically’ minimised inventory costs through 
inappropriate assumptions. Orlicky (1975) criticised the inherent inability of EOQ models to 
coordinate related production requirements. 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Insert Figure 4 Here 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
 
  
 
 
4.2 Inventory status 
In the Planning Office the ‘balance of stores clerk’ managed inventory and outstanding orders 
using a specific form to monitor inventories and ensure materials were available to satisfy 
requirements. This used existing inventories to reduce gross requirements so the factory only 
produced to meet demand or stocking needs. Taylor's Planning Office preceded EOQ theory so 
the issue of what quantities to produce was open. Elbourne (1918: 171) recognised that 
increasing order sizes improved productivity by spreading set-up costs.  However, he noted these 
benefits were often lost when customer's orders were expedited ahead of orders intended only for 
stock- the resulting lot-splitting then increased set up costs. The anticipated economies of scale 
were not achieved. A sales-driven approach seems to have been normal practice1, Elbourne 
(1918: 153) suggested that: ‘... the practice of ordering practically all material only as and when 
required to meet specific orders has a great deal to recommend it.’ to avoid excessive 
inventories. Despite that, production for stock could be useful so he suggested a reorder point 
                                                 
1
 A digression on inventory management history: The operations management literature ignores 
historic alternatives to Economic Order Quantities. This oversight requires rectification. Whitin 
(1953) considers EOQs but briefly mentions ‘hand-to-mouth buying’, a lean approach in which 
producers make only enough for immediate needs. This policy became dominant after a crisis in 
1921 (Lyon, 1929: 9-10) when a severe contraction in sales left many companies with 
dangerously high inventories. There are several references (Clark, 1927-8; Lyon, 1929; McGill, 
1927; Tosdal, 1932-3) to it throughout the 1920s and 1930s and the survey undertaken by Lyon 
(1929: 6, 93, 275) shows it to have been widely used across several industries with discussions of 
it being ‘general and profuse’. Lyon (1929: 424-445) describes the history of ‘hand-to-mouth’ 
buying, observing that it was normal practice for most of the 1800s. The effects of improving 
transportation and communications on production management are particularly interesting. In the 
very early 1800s buying and production was seemingly often based on an annual period, the 
difficulties of transport and communication dictated that distant customers ordered once yearly to 
meet all their needs. With the introduction of rail transport and steamboats the reducing cost and 
increasing reliability of delivery allowed more frequent ordering (Lyon, 1929: 444). This 
smoothed demand throughout the year but the basic, underlying principle of buying only to meet 
needs remained. Lyon (1929: 376, 458) also discuss the impact of improving communications, 
noting that telegraphy had the same effects in the mid-1800s as telephony in the early 1900s had 
on speeding communications (and we note similar effects email has now, a century later). Lyon 
(1929: 445) observes that the lowered costs and greater speed of rail transport echoed the earlier 
effects of canal building that allowed water transport to replace overland carriage. ‘Hand-to-
mouth’ buying remained popular despite the EOQ’s development, Lyon (1929: 450) implicitly 
refers to Harris (1913) when he observes ‘The increasing acceptance of engineering ideals in 
production has, particularly during the past 15 years, been working its way into the buying and 
selling function.’. He speculates that increasing numbers of business schools will promote those 
methods. The Planning Office was driven by sales; the EOQ had not yet been invented. Indeed, 
Taylor’s work created an atmosphere that encouraged such theorizing. Lean manufacturing may 
be rediscovering historic policies linking production to customer needs thereby reducing or 
minimizing inventories. The strategic pressures Lyon (1929: 448) found favouring ‘hand-to-
mouth’ buying remain: the tensions between having too much vs. too little, having it too soon vs. 
too late, having too much variety vs. too limited stock; all these difficulties may be resolved by 
matching purchases to customers’ wants. 
  
 
 
technique:  
Not only should the ordering level be fixed but also the normal quantity to be 
ordered, and both must have regard to the time required for obtaining fresh 
supplies and the liability of the stock becoming exhausted meantime (Elbourne, 
1918: 154). 
The lot sizing technique is not described and no consistent method seems used. When orders are 
not dictated by sales then Elbourne (1918) suggested a fixed quantity approach. The planning 
horizon seems undefined, determined by customer orders and lead times needed. Inventory 
control ensured sufficient short-term stocks to satisfy production and sales requirements. The 
planning horizon was ambiguous and defined by business needs. Koepke (1941) vaguely 
describes a planning period of ‘several months’. In the 1930s accounting machine 
implementations had fixed planning horizons dictated by design and processing requirements, as 
MRP also found necessary.  
4.3 Master scheduling  
The Planning Office seemingly was demand driven, scheduling production as orders 
were received. Production requirements (quantities, times, etc.) followed the logic implicit in the 
production process, as seen in Figure 3. The Planning Office had routings detailing the processes 
and their sequencing, it had balance of stores information to determine what assemblies, 
components and other materials would need to be made or purchased; and it had work methods 
and time study data so that it could direct workers to perform the work and accurately estimate 
the time needed. This was a complex planning process, one that individual workers themselves 
could not have performed. Indeed, Taylor asserts that no one manager could do it and that 
specialisation and sub-division were essential. Modern, large scale manufacturing requires 
coordination; what Taylor attempted with a manual system was replicated in the 1960s and 
1970s by MRP. MRP's logic is imposed on production processes by a computer-based, batch-
driven planning system. Much writing on MRP discusses its processing logic and operations 
with an emphasis on adapting operations (e.g., using non-descriptive part numbers, rigidly 
defined BOMs, etc.) to accommodate the requirements and limitations of computerization. The 
logic used in the Planning Office is identical with that used by MRP in coordinating the times 
and quantities produced. Differences between them reflect differences between using people or 
computers for handling and processing the information. 
The MRP master schedule specifies the quantities and times when finished goods are 
needed and thereby dictates when all contributory production activities should happen. Figure 7 
(Kimball, 1925: 158) shows a master schedule driven Planning Office, just as it would be for 
MRP. Production is driven by customer demands or management's ideas on the appropriate 
quantities of inventory. In many early MRP systems the master schedule was used as a buffer 
insulating production processes from demand fluctuations. MRP systems using ‘zero’ inventory 
policies are demand driven. Elbourne (1918) has sales stimulating production, and does not 
explicitly describe using planning to smooth sales variations. Clark describes (1922: 68-69) how 
plans are useful for managing sales fluctuations. When sales fall the plan can be used to identify 
products or periods where sales should be increased. The plan could also be used to identify 
workers or equipment to reassign to other products or jobs. Under sales increases the plan would 
show products or periods with lengthening delivery times and potentially unsatisfied or 
  
 
 
disgruntled customers; additional workers could be assigned to alleviate those problems. The 
plan would also help identify bottlenecks that need additional staff or equipment. Since sales 
were the driving factor a ‘Chase Demand’ strategy was explicit in planning. 
4.4 MRP logic 
High-level system flowcharts are a key tool for illustrating the scale and complexity of 
these complex production management systems. These provide an overall perspective on the 
various system elements and their operations. For comparison to MRP, Figure 5 shows a 
comparable system flowchart for IBM’s Computer Oriented Production and Inventory Control 
System (COPICS) from the 1960s.  
Figure 6 shows a flow chart illustrating a 1940s production planning and control system 
(Moore, 1951: 332). This was implemented on accounting machines (Alford and Bangs, 1945; 
Moore, 1951; Parton and Steres, 1955) that were crude, slow and limited compared to computers 
(IBM, 1961). Alford and Bangs (1945: 230) describe an accounting machine based system used 
to control the production of over 1,600 end items made from 58,000 components using 8,000 
different raw materials and another 14,000 purchased components. Of these, 60% of the 
components were used in multiple products, and there were significant differences in their lead 
times for both make-to-stock and make-to-order items. To further complicate matters there were 
large variations in sales.  
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Insert Figure 5 Here 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Insert Figure 6 Here 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
The BOM was not as important in the Planning Office as it was for MRP. Taylor treated 
the BOM as just one of many engineering documents; specifications and drawings, routings, 
processing instructions were needed too and Taylor recognised the importance of them all in 
managing production. These others are typically ignored by the central MRP planning process, 
yet for the Planning Office they were vital for managing production. Moore (1951) illustrates the 
role of BOMs in accounting machine systems. A well defined product structure is a universal 
need for any production system, and can be seen in every discussion of production management 
and coordination. These include Moore’s discussion (1951) of the BOM explosion in Figure 3; 
and the use of BOMs in earlier systems in Kimball (1925), shown here in Figure 7 and in 
Sterling (1914) shown in Figure 8. These flow charts show an evolving and increasingly 
complex presentation of the Planning Office’s roles and their interactions. 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Insert Figure 7 Here 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Insert Figure 8 Here 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Orlicky’s comprehensive discussion of MRP is not matched by any similarly clear 
explanation of a 1940s production management system, even Moore (1951); Parton and Steres 
  
 
 
(1955) and Hill (1961) discuss only their general use but say little or nothing about their 
operating details. Schlesinger (1949: Figure 57) provides a pictorial flowchart showing people, 
accounting machines and cards, but with minimal descriptions of their functions and 
interactions. This paucity of information is seen later too in many treatments of MRP. These 
were often too superficial or narrowly focused to provide a sound understanding of the whole. 
Orlicky (1975: ix) was motivated to write by observing ‘… the subject of materials requirements 
planning has been neglected in the hard-cover literature and academic curricula, in favor of 
techniques that people in industry now consider of low relevance….’ and goes on to say ‘I found 
that the entire MRP literature consisted of twenty-six items—good, bad and indifferent—all of 
which were either articles, excerpts, special reports, or trade press “testimonials” (Orlicky, 
1975).’ The earlier literature on accounting machine implementations of production control 
systems reveals the same lack of documentation. The technical documentation for MRP is more 
extensive and detailed (IBM, 1975) with nothing comparable available for the earlier systems. 
My decade-long search for IBM (1949), IBM (1953), IBM (1954) and Traub (undated) may yet 
find these and allow a more detailed comparison. The best summary of an ideal punched-card 
based production control system may be Hill (1961), though it lacks Orlicky’s (1975) 
thoroughness and figures illustrating its operations. 
Figures 5 through 8 illustrate the evolution of Planning Office implementations. Modern 
MRP using digital systems is shown in Figure 5 with its high level description of the functions 
done. Figure 6 shows a 1940s accounting machine implementation with a similar level of detail 
in its description. This is a ‘bridge’ that shares diagrammatic features with later digital systems 
while the accompanying text links it to Planning Office functions and operations. Figure 7 from 
Kimball (1925) and Figure 8 by Sterling (1914) show the evolving representations of the 
Planning Office: Sterling’s (and Diemer, 1914) is basic and crude, while Kimball’s is more 
complete. Sterling’s shows a basic manual system’s functions and activities. Kimball extends 
that, though still using manual information processing. Moore’s figure reflects their 
implementation on accounting machines. 
4.5 MRP tableau 
Perhaps the most useful feature of Orlicky (1975) are the tableaus that show explicitly 
the bill of material relationships, how current and planned inventories are used to determine net 
requirements, with lead-time offsetting yielding planned order releases; all over a fixed planning 
period. Each of these can be seen in numerous books (Alford and Bangs, 1945; and multiple 
editions throughout the 1940s and 1950s), Bethel, et al., 1942; Carroll, 1953; Fisher, 1928; 
Larkin, 1947; MacNeice, 1951; Parton and Steres, 1955; Porter, 1929; Ritchie, 1951; Simmons 
and Dutton, 1945; Tiranti and Walter, 1946) throughout the 1930s and 1950s, sometimes in 
conjunction with others; but no one puts all these together where the full system may be 
observed as a coherent whole.  
Koepke (1949, 1954: 391; 1961: 151) presents the proto-tableau shown in Figure 9. This 
is the only pre-MRP example known. It has gross requirements, netting against on-hand stocks, 
projected requirements and order releases. It aggregates independent and dependent demands to 
find an item’s gross requirements. This shows links to lower level materials but does not show 
their tableaus. The inference that these materials were similarly managed is inescapable, but 
there is no documentation showing that in a tableau. Other descriptions of the system’s 
operations as shown in Figures 3 and 4 make that inference reasonable. DeCarlo (1955: 61) 
discusses a digital system in which end-item requirements drive the system: ‘From this will 
  
 
 
follow the computation of gross requirements, net requirements after processing with inventory 
files, and capacity requirements after scheduling.’  
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
Insert Figure 9 Here 
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<+>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
An earlier edition of Koepke (1941) discusses lead time offsets for coordinating 
deliveries and Master Schedules that combine forecasts with customer orders for ‘several months 
in advance’. (Koepke, 1941: 392-3) Koepke (1941: 420) describes an ‘accumulation form’ used 
‘where there are a number of parts to be accumulated for an assembly or subassembly, some 
methods should be worked out to bring all the required parts together at the right time.’  The 
conceptualisation of Tableaus appears to have arisen between 1941 because Koepke (1941) does 
not show them, and 1948, the date seen in Figure 9. 
4.6 Capacity management 
Poor capacity planning was a weakness of early MRP systems. This need was well 
addressed in the Planning Office by introducing a new production planning tool in the Gantt 
chart. The intimate connection between Gantt’s Charts and Taylor’s Planning Office is not 
widely known. They were sequentially published as papers 1002 (Gantt, 1903) and 1003 
(Taylor, 1903) in the same issue of the ASME Transactions and meant to be read together as 
mutually supporting (Copley, 1923). Taylor and Gantt anticipated the difficulties that bedevilled 
later uncapacitated MRP systems. Production plans also need to consider capacity to be 
successful. Taylor’s Planning Office relied on Gantt’s charts to provide that function. 
Gantt Charts were originally intended to be a general production planning tool. Porter 
(1929) shows applications in both make to stock and make to order production systems. MRP 
encountered significant difficulties in detailed capacity management and shop floor 
management. These were areas where Taylor’s work-study and the Planning Office asserted 
great control. Capacity planning and work flow management were a central issue in Taylor’s 
managing a factory’s overall operations. Gantt (1903) developed his charts during the mid-1890s 
specifically to handle production management problems for individual workers, machines and 
for the factory as a whole. Clark (1922) describes how Gantt charts were used for meeting 
customer requirements: 
If a promise of a delivery is to be kept, all the work in a plant must be planned so 
accurately that when a new order is received, it is possible to tell almost to a day 
when the work will be completed. The Gantt Progress Chart enables the manager 
to keep before him all the promises he has made, to concentrate his attention on 
overcoming obstacles and avoiding delays, and, when it is impossible to live up to 
a promise, it enables him to give the customer advance notice of the fact (Clark, 
1922: 84). 
In this quotation there are three notable points: 
1. The whole of the process was considered since Clark requires ‘all the work’ to be 
planned and controlled. Taylor's Planning Office subordinated the activities of individual 
workers and machines to the demands of the whole system.  
  
 
 
2. The ‘all the promises’ implies that the factory is driven by sales, with no juggling of 
commitments satisfying current needs (e.g. ‘rush’ orders) using resources meant for 
future use (regular orders for normal delivery).   
3. If the schedule is to be accurate ‘almost to a day’ then planning had to be precise. Delays 
and inefficiency could not be tolerated, and uncertainty would have been eliminated. 
These imposed significant communications and coordination loads on a centralised planning and 
control system: it had to identify work as it was completed, move it quickly between workers, 
and ensure that a multitude of activities planned to start or finish simultaneously actually did so.  
This is a complex theoretical and difficult practical problem. MRP was poor at resolving 
both aspects, although significant efforts were devoted to resolving these issues as the systems 
matured and became more widely used. Most notably, “rough-cut” capacity planning with “Bills 
of Capacity” were developed to attempt to address these problems. (Proud, 2007) Work in 
progress (WIP) in Taylor's system had to be kept relatively low to ease planning and facilitate 
shop floor co-ordination and control. (Clark, 1922) Reducing WIP also made controlling 
workers easier by limiting their options to only those for which the Planning Office had 
immediate needs. Work backlogs then would have been ‘planned’ as jobs finishing before later 
processes became available. This type of queue planning seems necessary for the plans and 
operations to be realistic. Because sales drove production plans these plans were also constraints 
on later sales. Existing sales dictated existing production plans with delivery dates being firm 
commitments to existing customers. New orders were scheduled as received, by their required 
delivery dates and had to fit in around existing production and sales obligations (Clark, 1922, 
Appendix 1). This reinforces the perspective that Planning Office was primarily sales driven. 
Once a commitment to sales was made the Planning Office then had a firm obligation to meet. 
5. Conclusions 
Mabert’s (2007) belief that 1940s production management systems used the logic of 
MRP can thus be substantiated. Although its elements were all available and used it is 
impossible to tell how fully these systems were implemented. There was no comprehensive 
description comparable to Orlicky (1975). It thus seems that individual implementations were 
idiosyncratic. Although the systems flow chart shown in Moore (1951) seems quite convincing 
strong doubts must remain about the extent and effectiveness of their implementation and use. 
The logic used in these accounting machine systems and their general operation itself originated 
yet earlier with Frederick W. Taylor’s Planning Office (PO) and his system of functional 
foremen. Taylor used people to provide the functions that later Accounting Machine and MRP 
systems fulfilled.  
Further development of this research sees potential opportunities in investigating the 
sources Taylor used for identifying and designing the different elements used within the 
Planning Office. But he said nothing about where he found these in his articles or books. The 
difficulties in tracing modern articles and proprietary information on the earliest digital and 
accounting machine implementations have already been noted and those may reveal further 
dimensions to operationalizing these systems. More broadly, as Cortada (1983) noted these 
systems resolved many data processing problems with techniques and processes upon which 
modern systems rely, and the history of computing would benefit from investigating these more 
deeply, so studies such as this one for production planning and control systems might be 
  
 
 
replicated in other applications and management areas such as financial transactions and control 
systems or marketing with sales and customer management systems. 
Sayles and Stewart (1995) observe selective perception and amnesia affecting 
developments in work flow management that apparently arise without reference to previous 
theory or practice. One striking aspect of the MRP ‘crusade’ (Miller and Sprague, 1975) was its 
sudden appearance without substantial provenance: many revolutionary concepts and practices 
came forward in MRP. As has been shown these ideas and practices had a long but unremarked 
history, some dating from earlier accounting machine implementations of production planning 
and control systems, but many more pre-dating those and originating with manual systems used 
by Frederick W. Taylor’s Planning Office. Taylor established a framework for later managers. 
Current enterprise resource planning systems now consider many features not found in the 
Planning Office, but Taylor also considered activities that current systems largely ignore. 
Taylor’s interests in work-study, job design and work methods improvement, as well as basic 
engineering and production organisation show a breadth of talent and ability. Taylor’s Planning 
Office was ahead of its time, and we might still learn from its engagement with these other areas. 
Initially the Planning Office was a failure, but the following century’s developments in 
information technologies—manual, electro-mechanical and digital eventually allowed its 
demands to be met. Organisations also grew and evolved so the multitude of functional foremen 
that Taylor’s contemporaries found so off-putting and costly eventually became the normal 
complement of managers, planners and other functionaries required by large, complex 
operations. The roots of MRP stretch back to Taylor’s Planning Office and its growth depended 
on a more advanced organisational and technological environment. 
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